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Francis v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, Nev. Adv. Op. No. 60 (Oct. 6, 2011) 1
CIVIL PROCEDURE – Privilege Against Self Incrimination
Summary
An appeal from a district court summary judgment in a contract action.
Disposition/Outcome
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it refused to permit a civil litigant to withdraw his Fifth Amendment invocation
and denied his requests to reopen and continue discovery because it properly balanced the
interests of the invoking party against the opposing party’s right to fair treatment.
Factual and Procedural History
Joseph Francis (“Francis”) owed $2 million to Wynn Las Vegas (“Wynn”) in outstanding
casino markers 2 resulting from a trip to Las Vegas in 2007. Francis acknowledged the debt and
stated his intention to pay but claimed entitlement to a discount. Francis never paid any portion
of the debt.
In June 2008, Wynn sued Francis for breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrichment,
and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Francis answered with various
affirmative defenses and counterclaims including breach of contract, conspiracy and extortion.
A stipulated schedule and discovery plan proceeded whereby Wynn produced initial disclosures
of over 100 documents, while Francis produced only a letter from his bank. In September 2008,
the Clark County District Attorney’s office initiated a criminal prosecution charging Francis with
theft and passing a bad check with intent to defraud, relating to the unpaid markers.
During depositions, without seeking any accommodation from the district court regarding
his self incrimination concerns, Francis asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege to nearly every
question from Wynn counsel. Discovery closed in April 2009 with no attempt by Francis to cure
his deposition or waive his privilege.
Wynn filed a motion for summary judgment in May 2009 based on Francis’s bad faith
assertion of privilege and failure to present any evidence contradicting Wynn’s evidence. In
opposing Wynn’s motion for summary judgment, Francis asserted that a genuine issue of
material fact existed regarding the amount owed because he was entitled to a discount and Wynn
failed to mitigate its damages. Francis sought to reopen discovery, 3 stating he might still cure his
deposition. During the summary judgment hearing, Francis’s counsel indicated Francis would
like to withdraw his privilege.
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By Amanda Ireland
The Court explained that a casino marker is an instrument that is the equivalent of a check for purposes of NEV.
REV. STAT. §205.130(1) (2007), the Nevada bad check statute.
3
Francis also sought a continuance to conduct discovery under NEV. R. CIV. P. 56(f), seeking to subpoena bank
records and depose two individuals.
2

Noting that Francis’s deposition was “the most ridiculous exercise of the 5th
Amendment,” the district court granted summary judgment against Francis and found he owed
Wynn $2 million on the unpaid markers. The court determined Francis improperly asserted the
Fifth Amendment privilege and produced no evidence to rebut Wynn. The court refused to
permit Francis to withdraw his invocation or reopen discovery and denied his motion for
continuance of discovery because he explained neither his failure to undertake discovery nor
how extending discovery would produce a genuine issue of material fact.
Discussion
Justice Saitta authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court followed settled
federal precedent that a claim of privilege would not prevent an adverse finding or even
summary judgment if the litigant did not present sufficient evidence to satisfy the usual
evidentiary burdens. 4 Nonetheless, because the privilege against self-incrimination was
constitutionally protected, courts needed to carefully balance the interests of the party claiming
protection and the adversary’s entitlement to equitable treatment. 5 Federal case law further
guided the Court to elaborate upon the various considerations relevant to striking such balance.
When federal courts analyzed a request for accommodation for self-incrimination
concerns, they examined the nature and timing of the invocation or its withdrawal, the nature of
the civil proceeding and any parallel criminal proceeding, and the extent of prejudice an
opposing party would incur without remedial action. With timely requests for legitimate selfincrimination concerns a court “should explore all possible measures” to accommodate the
privilege. 6 However, attempted withdrawal at the last minute of a proceeding strongly indicated
an invoking party was abusing his or her privilege to gain an unfair advantage, 7 and in such
cases severe remedial measures - such as preventing the invoking party from presenting
previously protected material - were appropriate.
Where a defendant faced parallel civil and criminal proceedings brought by different
governmental entities arising from the same set of facts, courts could respond to a timely request
for accommodation of the privilege by granting a stay of the civil proceeding until the criminal
matter was concluded. 8 Finally, extensive remedial measures could be taken where the opposing
party would otherwise suffer substantial prejudice. 9 The Court concluded that courts could take
a wide range of remedial measures to balance the interests of the invoking party and the
opposing party’s right to fair treatment.
The Court determined that the relevant considerations weighed heavily in favor of the
remedial measures taken by the district court to balance the parties’ competing interests.
Notably, Francis never requested the court accommodate his privilege, his invocation was
overbroad and his refusal to answer nearly every question was unjustifiable. The Court found the
4
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United States v. 4003-4005 5th Ave., 55 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 1995).
SEC v. Graystone Nash, Inc., 25 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1994).
6
4003-4005 5th Ave., 55 F.3d at 84.
7
Id. at 85.
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SEC v. Zimmerman, 854 F. Supp. 896, 899 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
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4003-4005 5th Ave., 55 F.3d at 84.

timing and context of Francis’s attempted withdrawal problematic because he waited until Wynn
moved for summary judgment before indicating a willingness to withdraw his privilege, a last
minute attempt suggesting abuse of privilege. Additionally, Francis was not in the predicament
of defending parallel civil and criminal proceedings brought simultaneously by governmental
entities because Wynn brought the civil action, and Francis’s tactics resulted in unnecessary
expense and delay for Wynn.
Further, the Court stated that a motion for continuance under NRCP 56(f) was
appropriate only when the movant expressed how further discovery would lead to a genuine
issue of material fact, 10 and that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the
motion if the movant had previously “failed diligently to pursue discovery.” 11 Francis had not in
any way diligently pursued discovery, so the Court concluded the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Francis’s motion for a NRCP 56(f) continuance. Finally, given Francis
submitted no affidavits or admissible evidence to rebut Wynn’s motion for summary judgment,
the district court did not err in granting Wynn’s motion for summary judgment.
Conclusion
District courts should balance the interests of the invoking and opposing parties in the
face of a request for accommodation of the privilege against self incrimination. In striking such
a balance, courts should consider: the nature of the invocation, the manner and timing of any
withdrawal of invocation, the nature of the civil proceeding and any parallel criminal proceeding,
and the extent of prejudice an opposing party would incur without remedial action.
Here, Francis’s invocation of privilege was overbroad and unjustifiable, the timing of his
withdrawal suggested abuse of the privilege, and Wynn suffered unnecessary expense and delay.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Francis to withdraw
his invocation and denying his requests to reopen and continue discovery, and correspondingly,
there was no error in the grant of summary judgment.
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Aviation Ventures v. Joan Morris, Inc., 121 Nev. 113, 118, 110 P.3d 59, 62 (2005).
Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2001).

